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For the historian nothing ever totally goes away, 
except for those events for which no evidence 
has survived and that have, therefore, become 
permanently lost to all human recollection. Other 
than events and developments in this category, the 
great movements of human history from ancient, 
classical, medieval, and modern times—and  much 
more besides— are under constant scrutiny. Of 
course, it is possible to see these great eras, and the 
immense historical developments that took place 
in them, as continually receding from that point 
of experience between past and future that we call 
“the present.” Yet that “past” never completely 
goes away: tradition ensures that we carry with 
us a great deal of baggage from human history. 
Assessed from a biblical standard, traditions might 
be variously judged, but without tradition there can 
be no continuity in human history. And there are 
episodes or epochs or institutions in the human 
past that we might think have received some sort 
of historical burial, but they can surprise us by re-
emerging unexpectedly in a new form. When I was 
an undergraduate, it was emphasized that we lived 
in a post-colonial era. Imperialism was finished. 
That was then; this is now: empire is back.1
The Idea of Empire: Rome and After
The idea of empire has been with us for a long 
time. In the West, our notion of empire has arisen 
from the awe with which successive generations 
beheld the grandeur and legacy of Rome. For 
centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire in the 
West, men tended to see Rome as an ideal to which 
they ought to aspire. The Roman imperium was 
the yardstick of greatness. It was the inspiration 
for the Holy Roman Empire (sacrum romanum 
imperium), which had a continuous existence 
from its reconstitution by Otto I in 962 until its 
abolition by Napoleon in 1806.2 English overseas 
colonial expansion arose in the context of the “old 
imperialism,” led by the navigators of Portugal and 
the Spanish conquistadores. Early English maritime 
adventurism and colonialism came to exhibit a 
strongly Protestant mode of self-justification, 
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with its declared right to challenge any presumed 
Catholic monopoly across the seas.3 At the same 
time, it is worth remembering that empires have 
not always been in vogue. The United States often 
saw itself, and self-defined its distinctiveness, in 
terms of a repudiation of empire. In England, in 
the same year as the Declaration of Independence (1776), 
Adam Smith published his Wealth of Nations, which 
seemed to imply that empire was not necessary for 
prosperity,4 and Edward Gibbon his Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire, which suggested that empires 
tended towards corruption and disintegration.5 
The United States was long the home of anti-
(British) imperial sentiment. After the Great 
War (1914-18) various American writers were 
quick to argue that competitive imperialism had 
contributed to the coming of that disastrous 
conflict.6 In the United Kingdom itself, by the 
1930s, British left-wing thought especially was 
increasingly embarrassed by the racism and 
exploitation that imperialism seemed to entail, in 
part because such practices were explicitly endorsed 
by an increasingly powerful continental European 
Fascism.7 It was in this era that Winston Churchill 
found that his opposition to constitutional advance 
in India towards self-government was politically 
disadvantageous.8 After the fall of France, in 1940, 
Great Britain faced Germany and Italy alone, apart 
from the support she received from within her 
Empire. But lands such as Canada, South Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand were too remote and 
too thinly populated to offset the full weight of a 
European continent dominated by Nazi Germany. 
Of necessity, Great Britain sought support from 
a U.S.A. led by President Roosevelt. It eventually 
arrived, but only in full force after Nazi Germany 
declared war on the U.S.A. in the wake of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
It was at this time that Great Britain felt the 
full impact of American anti-imperialism. Pulling 
Britain’s imperial chestnuts out of the fire was 
definitely not part of the American taxpayer’s 
responsibilities, and there was soon talk from 
Washington that the European colonial empires 
should be placed under some sort of international 
control.9 As might be imagined, this was deeply 
resented in London. To the British this seemed 
both self-serving and hypocritical. Washington 
need not have worried. In truth, the British Empire, 
between 1922 (Ireland) and 1998 (Hong Kong), 
gradually faded away. The Statute of Westminster, 
1931 (an act of the British parliament), set “the 
Dominions,” such as Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, on the road to independent statehood. All 
ties between them and “the mother country” were 
to be voluntary. Great Britain, since the Durham 
Report of 1839, had learned to heed the prescient 
advice of Edmund Burke in his “Reconciliation 
with America” (1775).10
The Passing of the British Empire
The high-point of popular imperial sentiment 
in Great Britain itself had come at the outbreak 
of the South African War in 1899. The bitterness 
and disappointments of that conflict brought 
imperial disillusionment.11 After 1900, British 
politics became more preoccupied with welfare 
and defense at home than with expansion beyond 
the seas. The revival of imperial sentiment during 
the bloodletting of the Great War (1914-1918) 
was official rather than heartfelt. After 1919, the 
country was enfeebled, and the diplomatic unity of 
the British Empire could no longer be assumed. 
In 1921, Lloyd George, at the time of the Chanak 
Crisis with Turkey, found that the old methods 
no longer worked. Bonar Law, the Conservative 
leader at that time, declared that “We cannot act 
alone as the policeman of the world.”12 In 1919-20 
Great Britain and France, as victor powers, both 
managed to make a colossal miscalculation. They 
allowed themselves to presume that if they were 
weary and ill-disposed towards further expansion, 
then everyone else would stop behaving the way 
they had behaved in the nineteenth century. But 
others were far from satiated. In truth, the British 
and French governments could no more freeze the 
status quo in the world of 1919 than could Metternich 
in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. 
And even in 1919, the implications of the Amritsar 
(Jallianwala Bagh) massacre in India were clear: 
The United States was long 
the home of anti- (British) 
imperial sentiment.
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either Great Britain would have to choose between 
measured change across her widely-scattered 
empire, leading to self-government, or she could 
strive to maintain her position, even if doing so 
entailed severe repression and wading through the 
blood of rebellious subjects. After 1919, it became 
clear that the British electorate had no taste for the 
latter course.
The fall of France in June 1940 left Great 
Britain without a single great power ally. She was 
hard-pressed to defend herself against a Germany 
that now controlled a significant portion of Europe 
and an Italy that presumed for herself dominance 
in the Mediterranean and East Africa.13 This is why 
Britain found herself dependent on America in 
1940, a situation ultimately incompatible with the 
maintenance of her empire. The British nightmare 
was to confront three great powers single-handedly: 
Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, 
and Japan in East Asia. The full nightmare finally 
materialized in December 1941, but deliverance 
came at the same time because when Japan struck 
at Great Britain in Hong Kong and Malaya, she 
also struck at the United States in the Philippines 
and at Pearl Harbor. This brought the manpower, 
resources, and prodigious productive capacity 
of the United States into the conflict against the 
Axis and on the side of Great Britain and Soviet 
Russia. This was the era in which the United States, 
already a great power, flexed her muscles and clearly 
became a global power.14 
If the British Empire ever went with a 
resounding crash, it was at the fall of Singapore 
to Japan in February 1942.15 The importance of 
this catastrophe was perhaps obscured by the 
curious after-life that the British Empire enjoyed 
for at time after 1945, in some areas even on into 
the 1960s. But the tide was definitely running out. 
The Second World War produced a significant 
wave of pro-Dominion (i.e., Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and South Africa) sentiment in 
Great Britain but no renewals of anything like a 
commitment to empire as such. 
After 1945, the old sort of imperialism became 
internationally passé. The two emergent “super-
powers,” the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., were both 
officially “anti-imperialist.” They were not generally 
seen as empires at this time because imperialism 
still tended to be equated with the colonial empires 
of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and Portugal. These empires were passing. 
India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, 
Burma and Ceylon in 1948.16 
It is in these years that the passing of the Pax 
Britannica and the arrival of the Pax Americana 
took place,17 perhaps best exemplified in Britain’s 
February 1947 statement to Washington of her 
inability to continue to provide aid to Greece and 
Turkey and in the consequential statement of the 
“Truman Doctrine.”18 If America did not exactly 
step into Britain’s shoes, she often found herself 
stepping into her place.  
The British Debate on Empire
The last expansion-affirming, self-congratulating 
account of the British Empire taken at all seriously 
appeared in 1950.19 Thereafter, the de-colonization 
of sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asian, and the 
Caribbean and South Pacific island territories 
proceeded a-pace from 1957 onwards. In some 
places the process was far too rushed, the 
responsibilities of “independence” came too soon, 
and the consequences included immense loss of 
life.20 The story of the end of empire has been told 
constitutionally by Nicholas Mansergh,21 politically 
and strategically by Max Beloff,22 belligerently by 
Corelli Barnett,23 and aesthetically by James Morris 
in a renowned trilogy.24
In Great Britain itself, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
what little was left of the British imperial spirit 
was subjected to withering criticism from within.25 
In retrospect it seemed that a mighty battle had 
been fought between William Ewart Gladstone 
(1809-98) and Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81) 
over Great Britain’s posture in the world. Was 
it to be free trade and prosperity or territorial 
aggrandizement by imperial expansion? The 
former led to standing with Russia against the Turk 
in defense of European civilization, the latter with 
the Turk against Russia for reasons of imperial 
security.26 Although Gladstone, “the Grand Old 
Man,” outlived the “Tory” Disraeli, it was the 
imperial vision of the latter that won the day—but 
only for the time being, for things were to look 
very different after the South African War of 1899 
and Great War of 1914.
It was not until the 1960s that the idea of empire 
first received the scholarly attention it surely merits, 
in the form of Richard Koebner’s writings on 
Empire (1961) and Imperialism (1964). Koebner’s work 
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was of great breadth and profound scholarship.27 
He drew attention to a number of salient points. 
At the time of the Reformation, parliament laid 
statutory claim to an imperial status for England in 
repudiation of any Papal claims.28 For a long time, 
when Englishmen spoke of “the empire,” they 
often meant England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, 
rather than an array of far-flung colonies. And 
deep into the nineteenth century, British sentiment 
was suspicious of “imperialism” as too reminiscent 
of the empire of Napoleon. Disraeli’s “Empire of 
India,” with Victoria taking the title of “Empress 
of India,” was a late innovation, distasteful to 
many Englishmen because it carried too close an 
association with oriental despotism. 
Koebner’s work was published in a period that 
saw a great flowering of literature on the history, 
character, and motivations of the British Empire. 
This literature came to a peak from the 1950s 
to the mid-1970s, even as the empire was itself 
was fading rapidly. Much arose from the seminal 
paper by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson 
on “The Imperialism of Free Trade.”29 Was 
there a new imperialism in the late nineteenth 
century? What was its character? How much 
was its expansion driven by the imperial capital, 
and how much by the need to respond to the 
challenging exigencies of the imperial frontier? 
How is this late-nineteenth-century expansion 
of empire to be explained, given the end of the 
(mercantilist) “old colonial system” on which 
the (post-Yorktown) “second British Empire” 
was originally based, thanks to the rise of “free 
trade”?30 How therefore did “free trade” function 
in relation to empire? Was “free trade” really 
anti-colonial empire? In his influential lectures 
on British global expansion, J. R. Seeley famously 
remarked that the British Empire was acquired 
in a “fit of absence of mind.”31 Was the British 
colonial empire ever an unintended by-product of 
“free trade” style commercial activity?
There seemed to be a great deal of deliberate 
expansion going on at the very time in which 
Seeley was writing. It is hard to imagine that the 
massive empire of 1914, which so excited the envy 
of other great powers, was the result of no policies 
whatsoever. Gallagher and Robinson argue that the 
empire was primarily an empire of commerce, that 
the “new imperialism” of the mid to late nineteenth 
century was a continuation of existing policy in 
response to changing conditions, and that empire 
might be formal (as with colonies) or “informal,” 
as in spheres of economic hegemony, such as 
Latin America.32 Territorial expansion was never 
engaged in for its own sake, whether to provide 
strategic depth or to pre-empt rivals. Commerce, 
investment, and the protection of trade routes were 
the prime motivations.33 
Not everyone agreed. There were always 
those who found “informal empire” too fluid 
a concept, seeming to include even the U.S.A. 
within a British “informal empire” (even though 
the U.S.A. was itself a great power by the end 
of the nineteenth century), and those who saw 
mid-century British free-traders as decidedly 
anti-imperialist.34 D. K. Fieldhouse expressed 
doubts, for far too much imperial action seemed 
to lack sufficient economic justification – a 
great deal of empire did not pay.35 By contrast, 
and in a succession of works, D. C. M. Platt 
strongly criticized the imperialism of free trade 
idea, especially with reference to Latin America. 
Moreover, the “new imperialism” of the late 
nineteenth century was partly attributable to the 
need to protect British “free trading” interests 
against the protectionism of others. For Platt, 
the term “the imperialism of free trade” was 
insufficiently precise and therefore misleading.36 
From these and related discussions there 
eventually emerged a more nuanced and refocused 
understanding of Victorian imperialism and free-
trade convictions: the concept of “gentlemanly 
capitalism,” especially as annunciated in the work 
of P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins.37 The “gentlemanly 
capitalism” model of global imperial commercial 
activity has proved to be remarkably fruitful. 
Without being overly prescriptive, it pointed to 
the money-making motivation behind so much 
Western activity across the rest of the world.38 
Was the British colonial 
empire ever an unintended 
by-product of “free trade” 
style commercial activity?
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The American Empire and the British
It is in this context that two very influential 
writers, working in distinct disciplines, have 
helped to put empire once again at front stage. 
The first is Niall Ferguson (b. 1964), a historian 
of modern history, and the second N.T. “Tom” 
Wright (b. 1948), a leading scholar in the field of 
New Testament studies. It is hardly surprising that 
both see the U.S.A.’s global reach and hegemonic 
tendencies as imperial in character. Both of these 
scholars are British, and while the British might not 
have an empire any longer, “they know one when 
they see one,” as the saying goes, and both writers 
have established an extensive readership beyond 
the limits of academia, not least in the U.S.A. 
Niall Ferguson first came to widespread 
attention with his willingness to re-consider certain 
of the questions relating to Great Britain’s part in 
the circumstances that led up to the outbreak of 
the Great War of 1914.39 His contribution to the 
literature is his Empire: The Rise and Demise of the 
British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power. 
This work invites its readers to see the British 
Empire as a pointing to the phenomenon of 
Anglophone globalization.40 For Ferguson, one of 
the many tragedies arising from the First World 
War was that it severely retarded the globalization 
process that the British world trading system 
greatly facilitated.41 Ferguson’s conclusion is 
that the U.S.A. inherited Great Britain’s former 
position, without fully appreciating its implications 
and perils.42 The British Empire was more 
benign than many other empires, but it was still 
marked with crimes and injustices.43 The British 
found that while empire brings a measure of 
respect, and sometimes even admiration,  it only 
occasionally evokes gratitude and hardly ever love. 
It is clear that whenever Ferguson writes about 
the British imperial experience, a cross-reference 
to contemporary America is not so far from his 
mind. Ferguson urges Americans to consider that 
their present global hegemony (challenged though 
it is by violent Islamic jihad) amounts to a form 
of capitalistic imperium. His Empire was quickly 
followed by Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire. 
For Ferguson, who does not oppose the American 
empire as such, the U.S.A. is an empire significantly 
in denial, lacking an adequate understanding of its 
own hegemonic character.44 
Certainly within the U.S.A., over a century ago, 
considerable misgivings were expressed by William 
Jennings Bryan and the Anti-Imperialist League 
at the time the U.S.A was acquiring a modest 
formal empire, including Hawaii, the Philippines, 
and Puerto Rico.45 The modern American empire 
is not territorial but informal, based on finance, 
commerce and cultural predominance; and it 
seems to be hard for many Americans to envisage 
this also as empire.46 Therefore, in the U.S.A. 
the cry still goes up, “We don’t do empire.”47 Yet 
such a cry belies the truth. While the U.S.A. has 
engaged in some more formal “empire-building” 
(in the Pacific and Caribbean) than its citizens 
appreciate, America’s de facto global hegemony is 
preeminently that of “informal empire” backed by 
military power. 48Whereas British laissez faire style 
gentlemanly capitalism found its embodiment in 
the limited-liability stock company, its American 
counterpart has been the even more impressive 
U.S.-based multi-national business corporation.49 
In Great Britain the dominance of conservatism 
in the late nineteenth century tended to privilege 
the financial sector over the (still largely liberal) 
manufacturing interest—a trend that lasted well 
into the twentieth century.50 Moreover, the English 
agrarian ideal of the gentleman living on his rural 
estate, with a town house in London for “the 
season,” was highly influential, sidetracking many 
of the more successful away from the challenges and 
rewards of further enterprise and development.51 
It was not so in the U.S.A. Here estate acquisition 
seems not to have generally impeded individual 
ambition or corporate growth and development. 
The triumph of the north was the triumph of 
protectionism. After the Civil War, through one 
business cycle after another, shielded by a high 
protective tariff but stimulated by the burgeoning 
size of its domestic markets and the efficiency of 
its distribution networks, American corporate 
and economic growth assumed unparalleled 
proportions. By 1914 the U.S.A. was the leading 
power in many areas of industrial and agricultural 
productivity. In one key index after another she 
came to surpass Great Britain and Germany 
combined. Even if the European great powers had 
not torn themselves to pieces commencing in 1914, 
there are strong indications that the twentieth 
century would still have witnessed the rise of the 
U.S.A to global preeminence. The follies, crimes, 
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and tragedies of Europe provided the context and 
largely shaped the circumstances in which this 
rise happened, but it would most probably have 
happened anyway.52
After 1919 the U.S.A. was the world’s top power 
economically, although she did not yet assume prime 
responsibility for the global financial system. The 
1939 renewal of great power hostilities in Europe, 
hit hard by the post-1929 Great Depression (at 
its worst in the early 1930s), breathed new life 
and profitability into the spare industrial capacity 
left over from the boom that had ended in 1929. 
With the devastation of Europe by 1945, global 
leadership (excluding the Soviet Block) inevitably 
fell to the U.S.A. The Bretton Woods Agreement 
(1944) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) (1947) were both ordered according 
to American national interests. As the undisputed 
economic and financial hegemon, the U.S.A now 
argued for a lowering of tariffs and the promotion 
of “free trade” when and where it was to her 
advantage. This can be seen as an “imperialism of 
free trade” of a new sort. Certainly, our present-
day advocates of globalization can sometimes 
sound like those British free trade stalwarts of the 
nineteenth century, Richard Cobden (1804-65) 
and John Bright (1811-89).53
It is significant that the American empire, 
which emerged in the twentieth century, was 
primarily based on inventiveness, productivity, 
competitiveness, and marketing. The market-
driven, inventive fecundity of the American 
mechanical imagination produced a seemingly 
endless stream of product innovations and 
improvements. The American-style marketing of 
food has for more than a century concentrated on 
“adding value” to the basic product—economic 
value, that is, not necessarily nutritional value. 
American production, trade, and commerce 
exhibited a relentless drive to maximize 
profitability through ever more sophisticated 
marketing and production techniques. It was in 
the U.S.A. that the techniques of mass production 
came to their fullest expression: radios, washing 
machines, vacuum cleaners, and automobiles in 
peacetime; tanks, aircraft-carriers, liberty ships, 
fighters, and bombers in wartime. First in Europe 
and then around the world, successive generations 
of consumers became loyal to the U.S.A.-derived 
products of their choice. Eventually the time came 
when conservative gentlemen might object to “new 
fangled” American inventions, such as electric 
razors, forgetting that Mr. K. C. Gillette’s “safety 
razor” was yet another American innovation of 
an earlier generation.54 It is not surprising that 
America’s twentieth-century penetration of other 
Western, and eventually global, markets with a 
vast array of labor-saving devices and convenient 
gadgets has been described by one writer as the 
triumph of an irresistible empire. And all of this 
was typically American, the democratic impulse 
of mass marketing repeatedly overriding smaller 
economies based on regional or national culture 
or class-based preferences and expectations.55 This 
“American Empire” has arisen at least as much 
from entrepreneurial supremacy as it has from 
strategic imperatives.56
To these inventive, manufacturing, and 
marketing triumphs, we must add the formidably 
pervasive influence of the American-based media, 
including all forms of electronic entertainment—
and in America entertainment (including 
professional and much other sport) is an industry. 
As an alignment of powers, Wall Street, Madison 
Avenue, Nashville, and Hollywood present a 
formidable combination. Using all the suggestive 
powers of illustration, music, and drama, they have 
shaped the self-understanding and priorities of 
hundreds of millions worldwide. It might be said 
that they have shaped the minds—colonized the 
thoughts—and formed the perceptions of these 
While the U.S.A. has 
engaged in some more 
formal “empire-building” (in 
the Pacific and Caribbean) 
than its citizens appreciate, 
America’s de facto global 
hegemony is preeminently 
that of “informal empire” 
backed by military power.
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multitudes. This colonization of thought has given 
American styles and methods a hegemonic influence 
that is unparalleled in modern history, so much 
so, that Americanization and modernization have 
become, to all intents and purposes, synonymous. 
And all this came even before the internet and 
worldwide web, which have had such a colossal 
impact over the last decade. If the United States 
stepped into Great Britain’s place, she did so 
wearing shoes very much of her own making.
When writers today refer to “globalization” 
they generally have in view the way in which 
production, communication, and technology have 
become connected on a global scale. The U.S. is the 
prime player in agencies such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund in fostering 
and advancing this globalizing tendency. A great 
deal has come to depend on, or revolve around, 
American decisions and competencies. This is our 
equivalent of omnes viae Romam ducunt—all roads 
lead to Rome. This is not to say that others have 
no place in what some have dared to call “the new 
world order.”57 On the contrary, it is rather that 
others, multinational corporations from Europe or 
East Asia, for example, must now conform to the 
requirements of a milieu essentially shaped by their 
American archetypes.58 For such Europeans and 
Asians it is a case of Si fueris Romae, Romano vivito 
more—“When in Rome, do as the Romans do”— 
except that the new Rome is the U.S.-supervised 
and -superintended economic world order. 
Perhaps one of the most telling marks of America’s 
hegemonic pervasiveness is its evident success 
in convincing others of the universal validity of 
its concept of what constitutes success. Wealth, 
power, and technique combine to make the U.S.A 
the cornerstone of an encompassing world-system. 
Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Block 
(1989-91), the United States has been described as 
the “indispensable power.”59 
Above all else, this “hyper-power” is 
committed to advocating, advancing the scope of, 
even to placing faith in, “the market” and “market 
forces.” This is the context within which  much 
contemporary discussion about “globalization”—
also by Christians—is necessarily taking place.60 
Now, therefore, we find ourselves at a historical 
juncture at which we who are Christians in the 
U.S.A., and the West generally, need to strain and 
gasp—hunger and thirst—after righteousness 
and wisdom. This is, not least, because we need 
to subject all concepts of “the market” to a most 
careful, scripturally ordered analysis. 
We need to grasp that “the market” is 
an abstract term denoting the aggregate and 
cumulative buying and selling (exchanging) 
actions of countless decision makers. Moreover, 
these innumerable market-place participants (both 
individual and corporate) are all sinners, be they 
Christians or non-Christians. Accordingly, while 
an open market, justly conducted, in lawful goods, 
has a legitimate and highly constructive place in 
human affairs, the behavior of the market as we 
know it can never constitute a norm for right 
conduct and valid decision-making, because the 
behavior of the market reflects not only legitimate 
needs grounded in the order of creation (such as 
the need for food and shelter) but also the ever-
present sinful inclinations of its participants (such 
as the age-old demand for prostitutes). When 
everything is reduced to a commodity, everything 
becomes tradable in the market place. This being 
so, a “globalization” based on little more than the 
presumed supremacy of “market forces” may give 
leverage to a vast array of evils, even as it stands to 
make some individuals and corporations very rich.
Perhaps some clarification is appropriate at this 
point, if only because of the widespread tendency 
in both academic and church settings to try to as-
sess Christian thinkers as to whether they are in-
clining to “the left” or “the right.” The Calvinistic 
understanding of the Christian religion has always 
been robust in its affirmation of the sovereignty of 
God. Accordingly, those who are in Calvin’s line 
do not believe in the absolute sovereignty of the 
church or civil administration or society or the in-
dividual or the market. These are all law-ordered 
creatures. They have their own God-given au-
thority or sovereignty in their prescribed place or 
sphere. In this respect these creatures, the market 
included, all represent great blessings from the 
hand of Almighty God. 
Nevertheless, we are in deep trouble if we as-
cribe authority to market demands because time 
and again “the market” also reflects those demands 
and ways of doing things that betray our fallen 
condition. In such circumstances we can end up 
legitimizing the human sin that “market demand” 
inevitably reflects. It is clear that the “globaliza-
tion” of “market forces,” much advocated in our 
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as our contemporary spiritual counterpart to the 
Roman imperial system everywhere evident in the 
New Testament. The ambiguities are there also. 
We all know that Paul used his Roman citizenship 
to advantage.67 At the same time his message 
was that (the lawful office of the magistrate 
notwithstanding) Christ and not Caesar is Lord. 
Caesar’s office was to be honored, but God alone 
was to be feared (I Peter 2:17). 
When Jesus said that his kingdom was not of 
this world, he was not saying that it had nothing 
to do with this world but that it was not founded 
in any worldly principle. Christianity was not a 
religio licita within the Roman Empire. It was illicit 
because it would not participate in sacrificing 
to emperors as divine beings. In this respect it 
inevitably challenged—and challenges—Rome’s 
and anyone else’s claims (explicit or implicit) to 
be almighty. This is the central point about the 
Christian religion that inevitably urges it towards 
a public stance, however much the temptations of 
pietism might drive some into a world of private 
devotions and closet fellowships. And it is of 
no use our saying that Rome’s imperialism was 
oppressive whereas America is the champion of 
the “free market,” because the biblical answer is 
that Christ rules and the market is not a law unto 
itself: a standing legitimization of commercial 
antinomianism but a means of providing all 
time, will do this on a massive scale. To make the 
point minimally, one could say that an American-
led globalization based on “the free play of market 
forces,” which   ignores what the Bible says about 
creation, the human condition, and our all-encom-
passing need for redemption, is inevitably open to 
serious question. 
Thirty years ago the Kuyperian-Reformational 
thinker Bernard Zylstra addressed the question of 
American empire with considerable prescience.61 
Over the years, Christian thinkers such as Bob 
Goudzwaard have reflected long and hard on the 
assumptions and consequences of how capitalist 
economic systems have functioned in the West 
and now encompass the globe under the hegemon-
ic leadership of the U.S.A.62 Time and again, the 
“globalization” that we are offered, which so often 
suits multinational corporations, pays minimal at-
tention at best to human dignity and the cry of the 
poor and dispossessed for justice. 
The seeming triumph of the West under the 
hegemony of the United States is replete with am-
biguities for Christians, for whom Jesus Christ 
(and not the market) is king. These ambiguities 
are particularly evident as we consider the close 
inter-weaving of Western exploration and trade 
(including slavery) with Catholic and Protestant 
missions (including Bible translation and dissemi-
nation) over the centuries, across Asia, Africa and 
the Americas.63 The formula associated with Da-
vid Livingstone (1813-1873)—“Christianity, Com-
merce and Civilization”—now cries out for further 
critical scrutiny.64 Not least, we need to reflect on 
how much the dominant culture of commerce has 
shaped our understanding of the Christian faith 
that we profess—even to asking ourselves if salva-
tion has become for us a heaven-offered consumer 
commodity.
The American Empire and the Romans
And  now we are also being challenged to 
consider the parallels between the contemporary 
American empire, or hegemony, and the dominant 
position of Rome at the time of first-century 
Apostolic Christianity. These parallels are 
pronounced in the work of Richard Horsley65 and 
have been carried to a much wider readership by 
the English bishop and New Testament scholar N. 
T. Wright.66 Here we are confronted with a view 
that sees the global reach of the American empire 
This colonization of thought 
has given American 
styles and methods a 
hegemonic influence 
that is unparalleled in 
modern history, so much 
so, that Americanization 
and modernization have 
become, to all intents and 
purposes, synonymous. 
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humankind with lawful commodities and services 
in a lawful way. Indeed, we need to reflect carefully 
on the way in which the close union of Caesar’s 
empire and commercial exploitation is highlighted 
in the New Testament.68  
In the long span of its history, the Christian 
religion has another word that it would prefer 
to “globalization.” That word is “ecumenical” 
(oikonomia), which not only has ecclesiastical 
connotations for Christians but also refers to the 
economy of the entire human household (oikos), 
under the peaceable rule of Jesus Christ.69 It was 
once the proud boast of Habsburg monarchs that 
“the sun never sets on the Spanish Empire.”70 In 
their day, the British were wont to say, “The sun 
never sets on the British Empire.”71 Indeed, Spain, 
Britain, and America have all been tempted to 
flatter themselves that they were the designated 
instrument of the Almighty’s global purposes. 
Such flattery is liable to back-fire when the self-
delusions of empire are unmasked by the course 
of events, and the hammer blows of judgment 
fall. Ferguson, in a recent paper, has argued that 
there is a tendency for empires to be of decreasing 
duration.72 It is possible to discern at such points a 
certain eschatological “pull” within the texture of 
human history as we know it. It is not given to a 
single human institution to lord it over the earth. 
The history of human-kind presents us with the 
problem of the human condition, which cannot 
be resolved from within the resources of either 
human nature or human culture. The nations will 
only find peace and fulfillment in all their callings 
under the kingly rule of Jesus Christ.
Perhaps the greatest folly of our age is the hubris 
that leads us to presume that the world belongs to 
us—unless it is our current additional presumption 
that we can indulge such follies with impunity. The 
world does not belong to us—ultimately empire is 
not ours. Rather, “our world” (the cosmos that we 
have been given to cultivate and care for) belongs to 
God. It is “ours” to care for and develop according 
to the Creator’s command—which is always in 
line with humankind’s true wellbeing. Those 
Christians in these latter days who have taught us 
this truth have taught us rightly, and if we bring 
this truth home to ourselves, it will transform our 
thinking about empire and the issues presented by 
globalization.73
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